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INCORPORATION BY REFERENCENEW YORK MODIFICATIONSt
The trend in the development of the law of wills has been in the direction of
requiring greater formality in execution.1 But what appears to be a countercurrent in this trend is the doctrine of incorporation by reference, which permits
reference by a testator in his will to informal or formal unattested testamentary
documents, provided the documents referred to are in existence at the time of
the execution of the will, are referred to in the will as existing and are clearly
identified by satisfactory proof as the papers referred to in the will. 2 This
doctrine relaxes somewhat the rigid requirements for due execution of wills
by permitting the inclusion of unattested papers under the above conditions.
Thus, it appears that the courts are constantly trying to balance two contesting rules of testamentary procedure: on the one hand they seek to prevent
fraudulent alteration of wills and to ensure the posthumus execution of a testator's disposition of his property by a formal document which speaks effectively
and legally at his death; on the other hand the rule of incorporation by reference
is formulated to save unquestionably genuine legacies from amputation because
of testamentary reference to some existing, non-dispositive document.
The problem of incorporation by reference arises in several general ways:
1) where reference is made by a testator to an informal memorandum or writing; 2) where a testator by a reference to the back of a page or to an appended
page attempts a continuation of the text of the will beyond his signature; 3)
where reference is made to a prior invalid will in a valid codicil; 4) or, where
reference is made to a formal document such as a trust deed or the will of
another person.
Incorporation of Informal Documents
Where an extraneous document referred to in a will is not dispositive in
character but merely describes and identifies property bequeathed or devised
such reference is clearly permissible for the purpose of clarifying the testator's
intent. The rule of incorporation has no application because no dispositive
instrument is being incorporated.3 However, it is often difficult to determine
whether the instrument referred to is a testamentary document or merely
identifies a gift.4
t This article, save for minor changes, was prepared by Miss Eleanor C. Shoemaker, and
submitted to the FORDHAw LAW REVIEW shortly before her untimely death, October 20, 1940.
1. See 1 PAGE, LAW or WiLs (2d ed. 1928) § 232; 1 JARMA,', A TREATisE ON WiLLs
(6th ed. 1893) *76 et. seq.
2. 1 JARmAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at *97-100; See Newton v. Seaman's Friend Society, 130
Mass. 91, 93, 39 Am. Rep. 433 (1881); Keeler v. Merchants' Loan & Trust Co., 253 Ill.
528, 529, 97 N. E. 1061, 1062 (1912).

3. O'Leary v. Lane, 149 Ark. 393, 232 S. W. 432 (1921); Tonnele v. Hall, 4 N. Y. 140
(1850). See Hatheway v. Smith, 79 Conn. 506, 519, 65 Atl. 1058, 1062 (1907); Phelps v.
Robbins, 40 Conn. 250, 271 (1873).
4. See Matter of Fowles, 222 N. Y. 222, 233 (1918).
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By the great weight of authority extraneous documents, although dispositive
in character, may be incorporated by reference into a will if the requisite conditions are satisfied.5 The first essential is that the document sought to be
incorporated be in existence at the time the will is executed and be clearly and
unambiguously referred to in the will as an existing instrument. 6 Parol evidence
is inadmissible in this respect to clarify any uncertainty or ambiguity of
language in the will. The identification of the extraneous document must be had
from a description given ii the will itself; otherwise the will is not wholly in
writing but rests partly in parol, a relaxation of the requirement of due
attestation which no court will venture to make. 7 However, the incorporation
in a will of a letter which was referred to in a second letter, the letter being incorporated in the will by reference has been allowed.8
In Simon v. Grayson9 a will, which was dated March 25, 1932, contained a
provision leaving $6,000 to the executors "to be paid by them in certain
amounts to certain persons as shall be directed by me in a letter that will be
found in my effects and ... will be dated March 25, 1932." The letter found
in the testator's safe deposit box was dated July 3, 1933. A codicil to the will
was executed on November 25, 1933, which contained no reference to the letter.
The court probated the letter as part of the will on the theory that the will was
republished by the execution of the codicil and that at the time of republication
of the will the letter was in existence.10
S. Newton v. Seaman's Friend Society, 130 Mass. 91, 39 Am. Rep. 449 (1881). Cases
in only five jurisdictions are to be found which renounce the doctrine of incorporation by
reference. O'Leary v. Lane, 149 Ark. 393, 394, 232 S. W. 432, 433 (1921) (actually, it was
held that the deeds, which the court refused to incorporate as part of the will, might be used
for the description of the property and the identification of the beneficiaries) ; Hatheway v.
Smith, 79 Conn. 506, 65 At. 1058 (1907); Succession of Ledet, 170 La. 449, 128 So. 273
(1930); Hartwell v. Martin, 71 N. J. Eq. 157, 63 Atl. 754 (1906); Murray v. Lewis, 94
N. J. Eq. 681, 121 AtI. 525 (1923) (Page points out that in each of the New Jersey cases
some essential requisites for the application of the doctrine were lacking. 1 PAGE, op. cit.
supra note 1, § 246); Booth v. Baptist Church, 126 N. Y. 215, 247, 28 N. E. 238, 242 (1891)
(Page points out that all the essential requisites for the application of the doctrine were
not present in this case. 1 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 423.) ; Matter of Bouvier, 257 App.
Div. 665, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 111 (1st Dep't 1939); Matter of Hilliard, 154 Misc. 872, 278
N. Y. Supp. 675 (Surr. Ct. 1935); Matter of Angle, 147 Misc. 445, 264 N. Y. Supp. 29 (Surr.
Ct. 1933). See Chaplin, Incorporationby Reference (1902) 2 COL. L. Rxv. 148.

6. See Appeal of Bryan, 77 Conn. 240, ?45, 58 Atl. 748, 750 (1904); Magnus v. Magnus,
80 N. J. Eq. 346, 84 AUt. 705 (1912).
7. Appeal of Bryan, supra note 6, at 251; In re Young's Estate, 123 Cal. 337, 55 Pac.
1011, 1012 (1899).

But see Estate of Shillaber, 74 Cal. 144, 145,,15 Pac. 453, 454 (1887).

8. Symes v. Appelbe E1887J 57 L. T. 599.
9. 102 P. (2d) 1081 (Cal. 1940).
10. The lower court refused to probate the letter as part of the will. Simon v. Grayson,
94 P. (2d) 1044 (Cal. 1939). It argued that the letter was not incorporated in the will
because it was not in existence at the time the will was executed. The codicil served to
republish the will as it stood at the time of its execution; it could not incorporate any
extraneous instrument which formed no part of the will at the time of its execution.
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The question whether papers referred to in a will, but not in existence at the
time of its execution may be probated as part of the will, if in existence at the
time of the execution of a codicil thereto, although no reference to such papers
is made in the codicil, has arisen with greater frequency in English jurisdictions
than American. Early decisions permitted incorporation in such case," but
were later overruled. 12 The law in this regard was compromised in the leading
case of Goods of Truro,'3 wherein it was held that the republication of a will by
the execution of a codicil will not of itself entitle an unexecuted paper, written
or signed between the date of the will and the date of the codicil, to probate.
But where the will, if read as speaking at the date of the execution of the codicil,
contains language which would operate as an incorporation of the document to
which it refers, such document, although not in existence until after the execution of the will, is entitled to probate by force of the codicil. Thus, where the
reference in the will was to a future document, papers executed between the
date of the will and codicil will be refused probate. 14 The language of the will
must refer to the extrinsic document as an existing instrument in order that it
be probated.' 5
0 and
In the Simon case the court relied upon the cases of Goods of Truro"
Goods of Smart."' However, the facts in the Simon case violate the rule expounded by the British cases cited, since the language of the will refers to the
informal paper as a future instrument. An extenuating circumstance, however, is
that the will was dated March 25, 1932, and directs the executors to a paper
which will bear the same date. It may thus be argued that no sufficient length
of time is allowed to lapse to prevent the reference from being in praesenti.
A natural corollary to the rule of incorporation is that the testator must have
intended that the extraneous document be incorporated as part of his will. However, construction of the testator's intention from the language employed in the
will is oftimes difficult. In Witham v.WithlZam 8 the testator executed deeds of
real property to his sons which were never delivered. The will recited, "I have
heretofore transferred and conveyed to each of my sons certain parcels of my
real property." It was held that the deeds were not incorporated in the will;
a mere reference to an extrinsic instrument is not sufficient to show an intention
of the testator to incorporate it into his will. In a similar case a like decision was
reached by another court.' 9 The court stated, "It is obvious that the reference
in the will to the deed does not adopt the deed as part of the will, nor does it
otherwise appear therefrom that the testator intended to give the property
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Goods of Hunt (1853) 2 Rob. Eccl. 622; Goods of Stewart (1863) 3 Sw. & Tr. 192.
Goods of Mathias (1863) 3 Sw. &Tr. 100.
(1866) L. R. 1 P. & D. 201.
Goods of Reid (1868) 38 L. J. P. & M. 1.
Durham v. Northen [1895] 69 L. T. 691; Goods of Smart [1902] 71 L. J. P. 123.

16. (1866) L. R. 1 P. &D. 201.
17. [19021 71 L. J. P. 123.
18. 66 P. (2d) 281 (Ore. 1937).
19. Allenbach v. Ridenour, 51 Nev. 437, 279 Pac. 32 (1929).
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described in the deed by will. It expresses merely the opinion of the testator
that he bad conveyed by deed to take effect on his death. '20 An21opposite result,
however, was reached in the recent case, Matter of Hogue's Will.
A sound and embrasive rule concerning these cases was established in an
earlier decision by an Illinois court. 22 It stated, "where the recital is to the effect
that the testator has devised something in another part of the will, when in
fact he or she has not done so, and thus the recital turns out to be erroneous,
then such recital is construed to show a purpose and intention of the testator
to devise by will, and the courts carry out such purpose and intent to devise by
the will, and give such erroneous recital the effect of a devise by iinplication.
But when the recital in the will is to the effect that the testator has, by some
instrument other than the will, given to a certain person named in the recital
property, when in truth and in fact he has not done so, such an erroneous
recital does not disclose a purpose and intent on the part of the devisor to
give by the will."3
Incorporation of Matter Following Testator's Signature
JMost jurisdictions require a will to be signed at the foot or end thereof.
Under such statutes a will which is not signed at the end is invalid. 24 However,
attempts have been made to save such wills by application of the doctrine
of incorporation by reference. In Baker's Appeal25 a paragraph of the will
began, "4th I give and bequeath to David S. Baker, our son, Two Hundred."
Words which began a description of the devise were crossed out and alongside
were written the words, "see next page." The will was signed on the first page.
On the succeeding page was written an unsigned clause which was dispositive.
The court admitted the will to probate holding that the 4th clause was incorporated in the will by reference. 26 The requisites for incorporation were
specifically recognized by the court 27 with but one enlargement. Instead of an
explicit reference to the extraneous matter being required as a condition for
incorporation the court ruled that if a connection between the will and the
extraneous matter is shown to have been intended which can be established from
the internal sense of the instrument without resort to extrinsic proof that will
be sufficient. 28 This doctrine gives a court wide latitude of action to discover
a connection sufficient to save wills which otherwise would not be admitted to
probate. 2 9
20.
21.
1939).
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 36.
6 At]. (2d) 108 (Pa. 1939).

See also Hourigan v. McBee, 130 S. W. 661, 665 (Mo.

Hunt v. Evans, 134 IM. 496, 25 N. E. 579 (1890).
Id. at 580. See also Lander v. Lander, 217 Ill. 289, 75 N. E. 487, 489 (1905).
1 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 461.
107 Pa. St. Rep. 381, 52 Am. Rep. 478 (1884).
Id. at 389.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 389, 392, 394."The incongruity of permitting an incorporation by reference of matter which by the
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Among the jurisdictions which do not recognize the doctrine of incorporation
by reference resort may not ordinarily be had to such expedient in order to
save wills which would otherwise fail. 30 However, in Matter of Field,31 the New
York Court of Appeals distinguished and limited a respectable line of its
former decisions 2 in order to admit to probate a will drawn upon a short-form
printed blank which in the space intended for bequests contained the following,
"I will and direct that my estate be settled as per the provisions of the pages
hereto attached and numbered from one to six inclusive ... . " Immediately
after these words in said blank space there was attached by two pins six sheets
in the handwriting of the decedent, numbered by him at the top consecutively
from one to six, which contain the disposing provisions of the will. The
signature of the defendant was written at the bottom of the printed form. The
court ruled that a will should be read "as the mass of mankind would read it"
and the testator's signature at the logical end of the will, rather than the physical
end of the will, is sufficient compliance with the statute.
The rule of the Field case does not necessarily involve the doctrine of incorporation by reference but may be limited merely to an interpretation of the
words "subscribed ...at the end of the will."33 However, the case reaches the
same conclusion as does the Baker case by application of the doctrine of incorporation by reference. In both cases the requisites are the same, namely, the
matter sought to be included as part of the will must be connected therewith by
the internal sense of the will. The order of connection must appear upon the
face of the will, and cannot be established by extrinsic proof.3 4 Thus, no
variance of decision between the courts of New York and those of the states
adopting the doctrine of incorporation will be found in respect to the situation
found in Matter of Field.
Incorporationof An Invalid Will in A Codicil
A codicil duly executed may incorporate therein by reference a prior will
invalid because of improper execution or other, legal cause. 85 And where the
codicil is written on the same piece of paper as the will, the courts will relax
intention of the testator is already an integral part of his will is apparent, and, if permitted,
it should be limited in its application to cases where, in view of the form of the will and the
character of the matter sought to be incorporated, there is no room for the evasion of the
statute by subsequent additions to the will under the guise of incorporation by reference."
GARDNER, THE LAW Or WILLS (1916)

189.

30. Matter of O'Neil, 91 N. Y. 516 (1883); Matter of Conway, 124 N. Y. 455, 26 N. E.
1028 (1891); Matter of Whitney, 153 N. Y. 259, 47 N. E. 272 (1897); Matter of Andrews,
162 N. Y. 1, 56 N. E. 529 (1900).
31. 204 N. Y. 448, 97 N. E. 881 (1912).
32. See cases cited supra note 30; Matter of Peiser, 79 Misc. 668, 670, 140 N. Y. Supp.
844, 846 (Surr. Ct. 1913).
33. N. Y. DECEDENT EsTATE LAW § 21.
34. See Baker's Appeal, 107 Pa. St. Rep. 381, 392, 52 Am. Rep. 478, 488 (1884).
35. In re Plumel's Estate, 151 Cal. 77, 90 Pac. 192 (1907).
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the requirement of clear and unambiguous reference and will incorporate the will
although the only reference thereto is the use of the word, "codicil". 8 6
New York courts, however, distinguish between situations where the will fails
by reason of lack of due execution and where it fails solely by reason of the
application of. a rule of law.
In the leading case of Brown v. Clark3 7 the testatrix properly executed a will,
which by force of statute was revoked by her later marriage. Subsequently, she
executed a codicil which reaffirmed and adopted the earlier will. The New
York Court of Appeals ruled that execution of the codicil was a republication
of the will and that it and the codicil were to be considered as the will of the
testatrix. However, the court as part of its opinion recognized the application
of the doctrine of incorporation by reference and intimated that it was the
law of New York.38 This was, of course, before the decision of Booth v. Baptist
Church,a9 which repudiated the doctrine of incorporation in New York. However,
cases decided after the Booth case follow Brown v. Clark, but limit the grounds
for their decisions to republication rather than incorporation; that is, they hold
that the codicil has the effect of republishing the will and the will thereby republished speaks from the date of the codicil. 40 Under the New York rule a
will may be probated together with the codicil which republished it although
intermediate between the two the will had been revoked by the execution of a
second will; and proof of due execution of a codicil is sufficient to probate it
and the will Which it republishes although there may be failure of proof with
respect to the due execution of the will. 41
The New York position in this respect is consistent with its stand against
incorporation because an unattested document is not being admitted to probate.
36.

In re Plumel's Estate, supra note 35; In the Goods of Heathcote (1881) 6 P. D. 30.

37. 77 N. Y. 369 (1879).
38. "It is established by a long line of authorities that any written testamentary document
in existence at the execution of the will may, by reference, be incorporated into and become
a part of the will, provided the reference in the will is distinct and dearly identifies, or renders
capable of identification, by the aid of extrinsic proof, the document to which reference is
made." Brown v. Clark, 77 N. Y. 369, 377 (1879). The court cited in support of its
statement Tonnele v. Hall, 4 N. Y. 140 (1850). In Caulfield v. Sullivan, 85 N. Y. 153, 160,.
(1881) the court stated: "The codicil distinctly referred to and identified the will and
reaffirmed the same, and hence the will and the codicil together constituted the will of the
testator; the provisions of the former may be treated as embodied in the latter, and both
may be treated as if executed and published at the same time."
39. 126 N. Y. 215, 28 N. E. 238 (1891). It has been pointed out that all the essential
requisites for the application of the doctrine of incorporation were not present in this
case. See note 5 supra. However, there has been sufficient affirmance of the dictum of the
Booth case, if dictum it be, to establish in New York a firm stand against incorporation.
See Matter of Fowles 222 N. Y. 327, 331, 179 N. E. 755 (1932).
40. Matter of Campbell, 170 N. Y. 84, 62 N. E. 1070 (1902); Cook v. White, 43 App. Div.
388, 60 N. Y. Supp. 153 (2nd Dep't 1899).
41. Matter of Campbell, supra note 40; Caulfield v. Sullivan, 85 N. Y. 153 (1881); Newball v. Newhall, 280 Ill. 199, 117 N. E. 476 (1917).
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But where a codicil attempts to incorporate a will which has not been42 executed
with all the statutory formalities, probate of the latter will be denied.
Incorporationof Wills of Other Persons and Trust Deeds
The will of another person may be incorporated by reference provided all
requisites for application of the doctrine are met. However, such incorporation
is subject to defeat if the third person alters his will after the execution of the
will offered for probate. 43 Prior to the Booth case, in Matter of Piffard" the
New York Court of Appeals permitted such an incorporation. This case was,
45
however, affirmed, subsequent to the Booth decision, in Matter of Fowles. In
that
provision
with
his
wife
the latter case the testator left property in trust for
of
such
provisions
to
the
"pursuant
distributed
be
interest
remainder
a part of the
last Will and Testament as my said wife may leave". The court held that the
wife's will, insofar as it disposed of this trust property, could be read into the
husband's. The startling factor in this and in the Piffard cases, the factor
46
which Judge Crane selected as the basis for his dissent, was the adaptability
of any will the beneficiary might leave to the reference in the testator's will.
The doctrine of incorporation by reference requires that the document referred
to be in existence at the time the will is executed. The departure from this
standard formula made in the two cases under discussion can be explained only
by terming it a special type of incorporation by reference, which permits reference
42. Matter of Emmons, 110 App. Div. 701, 96 N. Y. Supp. 506 (1906); Matter of Lawler,
195 App. Div. 27, 185 N. Y. Supp. 726 (1920).
43. See Bemis v. Fletcher, 251 Mass. 178, 186, 146 N. E. 277 (1925), where the incorporation of a husband's will as part of his wife's will was permitted but the court indicated that
in so deciding it was of great importance to them that the husband's will was in existence
when the wife's was made. "She had in mind and referred to an existing will of her
husband, a will of which she had knowledge. She did not refer to any will her husband
We need not, therefore, consider what construction should
might execute in the future ....
be given to her will if her husband had made another will after 1910." See also, Dexter
v. Harvard College, 176 Mass. 192, 57 N. E. 371 (1900); Clark v. Dennison, 283 Pa. 285, 129
Atl. 94 (1925).
44. 111 N. Y. 410, 18 N. E. 718 (1888). The testator provided in his will that the
property he devised to his daughters should, if one of them predeceased him, be turned over
to their executors to be distributed as they might provide in any will they should leave.
One daughter did predecease the father and upon probate of his will the court referred
to her's to determine how the property devised to the daughter should be distributed.
45. 222 N. Y. 222, 118 N. E. 611 (1918).
46. Id. at 242. The reason for judge Crane's conclusion is, undoubtedly, that such
an arrangement appears to leave a will unfinished and dependent upon some future act for
its completion, and such a state of affairs conflicts with the basic purpose of statutes regulating and controlling the execution of wills; which is to direct definitely, though not irrevocably, the disposition of the testator's property to be made after his death. But the outward appearance is deceptive. Upon closer examination it appears that the testator's
will is complete on the day of execution, because it is his wish that another person shall
be free to dispose of certain property. His will is final. Only the exact recipient of that
portion of his property cannot be named on the day of execution.
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to wills of other persons whether in existence at the time of reference or not,47
or by deciding that it is really not an incorporation at all and create a new
name for it, which the Law Revision Commission has done. 48 The Law Revision
Commission calls it the doctrine of "non-testamentary act", which "allows a
testator to prescribe in his will that conduct which occurred before, or which
shall occur after the execution of his will, shall be material in determining his
dispositions, provided that such extrinsic conduct shall have an 'independent legal
significance'." 4 9
Judge Cardozo, speaking for the majority of the court in Matter of Fowles,
points out that the New York rule against incorporation by reference is only
a judicial doctrine and not a statutory prohibition and, therefore, should be kept
within bounds which -are "wise and just". Then, in giving reasons why no need
is present in Matter of Fowles for the application of the rule, the doctrine of
non-testamentary act is developed although no name is given to it or no attempt
is made to differentiate it from the doctrine of incorporation by reference. It
should be noted that by reason of the Fowles and Piffard cases,5" the New York
47. "Where however, the testator's intention is declared in an instrument properly executed as a will in which he disposes of the property in accordance with the terms of another
instrument also properly executed as a will, the evil intended to be obviated by the requirements of the Statute of Wills is obviated." And in footnote 85 on the same page: "The
decision in (Matter of Fowles) can be supported . . . on the ground that incorporation by
reference of the will of another is permitted even though incorporation by reference of
other instruments is not permitted and even though the will referred to was not necessarily
in existence at the time of the execution of the testator's will." Scott, Trusts and The Statute
of Wills (1930) 43 HARv. L. REV. 521, 552.
48.

LAw Ramsrox Coihnssro,

REPoRT, Rcomm.ENDA ONs AND STUDIES (1935) 440.

49. Ibid. The phrase "idependent legal significance" is taken from the opinion in the
case of Langdon v. Astor's Executors, 16 N. Y. 2 (1857), in which it was decided that the
account books of a testator could be referred to in order to determine the amount of a
legacy when the testator had provided that any advances made by him to his son should be
charged off against the amount of the legacy given to his son. Such payments were held to
have independent legal significance since they were not done solely for the purpose of
altering the will. The opinion contains a thorough discussion of the problem of whether
or not it is permissible to make the consummation of a testamentary gift dependent upon
the happening of an event in the future.
1 JARr, WirLs (6th ed. 1893) 130, discusses the situation which arises when the act of
a third person determines the beneficiary of a bequest; as where testator bequeathed to such
one or two persons as shall not become entitled to an estate from a third person; or when
the beneficiary is described by an indefinite designation such as, wife at the time of my death,
or servant at time of my death. The events which determine the vesting of such gifts
have independent legal significance.
go. In his dissenting opinion Judge McLaughlin distinguished the case before him from
Matter of Piffard on the ground that in the Fowles case the testator directed that his
executors turn over his estate to the persons named by his wife, whereas in the Piffard case
the property of the testator was to be turned over to the daughter's executors to be distributed
in accordance with the terms of her will. Matter of Fowles, supra note 45 at 246. Judge
Cardozo, in the majority opinion, asserts that there is no substance in the distinction.
Matter of Fowles supra note 45 at 231. But see Curley v. Lynch, 206 Mass. 289, 92 N. E.
429 (1910) which held that where a power of appointment is to be exercised by an appointee
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position with relation to reference to extrinsic wills is more liberal than the
position taken by states which recognize the doctrine of incorporation by
reference. 51
A further and perhaps more substantial relaxation of the rule against incorporation by reference is found in Matter of Rausch.5 2 The testator devised
one-fifth of his residuary estate to a trust company to be held under the same
terms and conditions as were embodied in a prior trust agreement entered into
betveen the testator and the trust company and which agreement was made part
of the will by reference. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division 53
and permitted the incorporation. Although several reasons are advanced to
support the decision, greatest reliance is placed upon the ground that "here the
extrinsic fact, identifying and explaining the gift already made, is as impersonal
and enduring as the inscription on a monument."54 This case has been followed
in a number of decisions. 55 It can best be explained by the doctrine of nontestamentary act. No statement was made in the Rausch case to indicate that
the decision might have been different if the trust was not irrevocable. In the
recent case of The Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz,50 the Appellate Division interpreting the reference to the enduring nature of the trust in Matter of Rausch
to mean that the irrevocability of the trust was the basis for the decision, refused
to allow incorporation of an amendable trust which was altered twice after the
execution of the will which referred to it.5 7 It is, of course, possible that the
Court of Appeals may decide the problem differently. It is suggested that it
is not important or desirable to make this distinction between revocable and
in her will, the power fails if she predeceases the testator and the provisions of her will
may not be incorporated by reference in the will of the testator.
51. See note 43 supra.
52. 258 N. Y. 327, 179 N. E. 755 (1932). Accord: Swetland v. Swetland, 102 N. J. Eq.
294, 140 At. 279 (1928). Contra: Hatheway v. Smith, 79 Conn. 506, 65 AtI. 1058 (1907).
53. Matter of Rausch, 234 App. Div. 626 (2d Dep't 1931).
54. Matter of Rausch, note 52 sura at 332. (Italics inserted). The court also stated,
"The rule against incorporation, well established though it is, is one that will not be carried
to a 'drily logical extreme' (Matter of Fowles, 222 N. Y. 222, 233). It is one thing to hold
that a testator may not import into his will an unattested memorandum of his mere desires
and expectations, his unexecuted plans (Booth v. Baptist Church of Christ, 126 N. Y. 215,
247). It is another thing to hold that he may not effectively enlarge the subject matter
of an existing trust by identifying the trust deed and the extent and nature of the
increment." Id at 331.
"The rule against incorporation is not a doctrinaire demand for an unattainable perfection.
It has its limits in the considerations of practical expediency that brought it into being.
Here the identification of the donee is itself an expression of the gift, the discovery of the
one, being equivalent to the ascertainment of the other." Id. at 333.
55. Matter of Hilliard, 154 Misc. 872, 278 N. Y. Supp. 675 (Surr. Ct. 1935) ; Matter of
Barlow, 144 Misc. 210, 258 N. Y. Supp. 451 (Surr. Ct. 1932); Matter of Andrus, 156 Misc.
268, 281 N. Y. Supp. 831 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
56. 260 App. Div. 174, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 232 (2d Dep't 1940).
57. Contra: Matter of Tiffany, 157 Misc. 873, 285 N. Y. Supp. 971 (Surr. Ct. 1935); Matter of Bremer, 157 Misc. 221, 281 N. Y. Supp. 264 (Sur. Ct. 1935).
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irrevocable trusts.5 8 Under the doctrine of "non-testamentary act," the act,
event or document referred to may come into existence or occur either before
or after the execution of the will; all that is required is that it have independent
legal significance. Certainly a trust deed although revocable has independent
legal significance.5 9
Conclusion
The doctrine of incorporation by reference arose from the desire of the courts
to alleviate the evils arising from the failure of wills under a strict construction
of the various Statutes of Wills. Courts which repudiate the doctrine do so
for the reason that they do not wish to open avenues of fraud which have been
closed by the legislatures. 60 However, in the long run greater damage is done
by a strict interpretation of the statutes than by adoption of the rule of
incorporation."' The doctrine is surrounded with sufficient safeguards to make
the practice of fraud upon testators an exception rather than the rule.
New York stands today against incorporation by reference of any informal
unattested paper, in a will. However, it permits incorporation of a valid will,
which has become inoperative for some reason, in a subsequent codicil, and it
permits incorporation of wills of other persons and of trust deeds. Rules relating
to the category of cases involving documents or acts of independent legal
Many harsh decisions are
significance are still to be formulated.
avoided by the exceptions already recognized. The view of the Law Revision
Commission is that no legislation with reference to the New York law in point
is desirable at present. 62 Unless abolition of the doctrine is desired, it is, in their
opinion, better to leave the law as it stands and let it continue to be shaped by
interpretations of the courts. A statute would tend to make the law inflexible
in an area in which rigidity is not yet desirable.
58. See dissenting opinion, The Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, supra note 56 at 237.
59: "This would seem merely a logical application of the modern doctrine of incorporation by reference as defined in Matter of Rausch's Will, . . . which appears to be that incorporation of any document in this manner is permissible so long as it is clearly identified
and is, of a variety which excludes any reasonable possibility of 'chicanery or mistake'."
Matter of Comey, 173 Misc. 377, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 949, 953 (Surr. Ct. 1940). This dictum
however is overruled by the Manhattan Co. v. janowitz, note 56, supra. The dictum goes
too far since thereunder any document answering the conditions would be admissible, which
amounts to adopting the rule of incorporation, a step which the Rausch Case did not take.
60. See note 5 sura.
61. The doctrine of incorporation by reference "operates only to prevent fraudulent
additions to testamentary instruments, and not as security against wills forged in their
entirety. We think the decisions of the courts of this State will be examined in vain in the
attempt to find six cases of alleged fraudulent additions to wills, or even half that number;
and it must be conceded that as to this supposed danger the remedy has proved in practice
far worse than the disease. In England a statute similar to our own, and construed as
strictly by the courts of that country as our statute has been construed by our courts, was
passed in 1837, (1 Vic. Ch. 26). The evils resulting from it proved so great that in 1853

(15 & 16 Vic. Ch. 24) it was modified." Matter of Field, 204 N. Y. 448, 454, 97 N. E.
881 (1912).
62. LAW
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